Paper Title
Exposure And Verification Of Neighbour Positions And Exhausting Existence From Wireless Ad Hoc Net Work

Abstract
we address this open issue by proposing a fully dispersed cooperative solution that is robust against independent and colluding adversaries, and can be impair only by an overwhelming presence of adversaries. Results show that our protocol can thwart more than 99 percent of the attacks under the best possible conditions for the adversaries, with smallest false positive rates. These “Vampire” attacks are not specific to any specific protocol, but rather rely on the properties of many accepted classes of steering protocols. We find that all examined protocols are weak to Vampire attacks, which are devastating, hard to notice, and are easy to carry out using as few as one hateful insider sharing only protocol-compliant messages. In the worst case, a single Vampire can increase network-wide energy custom by a factor of O(N), where N in the number of network nodes. We discuss methods to alleviate these types of attacks, including a new proof-of-concept protocol that provably bounds the break caused by Vampires during the packet forwarding phase.